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T he 2013 decision by the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates in Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,Inc. was seen by many as a triumph for public health. The opin-
ion declared human genes to be ineligible for patent protection under
the patent statute’s gatekeeping provision, § 101, allowing companies
offering single-gene diagnostic tests, like those for early onset breast
cancer risk at issue in Myriad Genetics, to flourish unencumbered by
patent strictures. After several controversial and confusing decisions by
the Supreme Court, however, there is now bipartisan interest in Congress
to amend § 101, including a recent proposal to overrule Myriad Genetics
and similar cases. Here, I review the legal crisis that has led legislators to
this place and discuss how amending § 101 to overrule Myriad Genetics
may—or may not—impact the public health.
Patent Eligibility and Health
Innovations
The threshold inquiry into whether an invention can be patented is
termed “patent eligibility” or “patentable subject matter” and derives
from § 101 of the patent statute. Perhaps surprisingly, § 101 has not
changed much from when it was first enacted—in 1790. In 1790, the
patent eligibility statute was open to “any useful art, manufacture, en-
gine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein.” Today, the same
statute is open to “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”
As health innovations have developed over the course of two
centuries—from ether to exome sequencing—courts rather than
Congress have filled in § 101’s lacunae to ensure that naked medi-
cal and scientific discoveries are not patented. In a 1948 decision on
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the patent eligibility of a collection of bacteria, the Supreme Court re-
ferred to such discoveries as “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all
men . . . manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none.”1 The precise language of § 101 notwithstanding,
courts have interpreted § 101 to bar patents covering natural laws,
phenomena, and products.
Since 2006, the Supreme Court has repeatedly revisited its patent
eligibility jurisprudence to give these prohibitions sharper teeth, in-
cluding a trio of opinions concerning patents on medical diagnostic
tests: LabCorp of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., in 2006
(a stand-alone opinion by Justice Stephen G. Breyer); Mayo Collabora-
tive Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., in 2012; and Myriad Genetics
in 2013. In each case, the Supreme Court further narrowed the patent
eligibility of medical diagnostics.
But, to many, Myriad Genetics was especially significant as a matter
of public health. Myriad Genetics had patented the genes BRCA1 and
BRCA2 and methods of conducting diagnostic tests to analyze patient
risk for early onset breast and ovarian cancer. Because Myriad refused to
license its patents to others, including individual clinical oncologists,
Myriad’s patents were widely seen as impinging on a broader market for
BRCA1 and BRCA2 diagnostics. The Supreme Court’s decision invali-
dating these patents as coequal with “products of nature” was, therefore,
viewed as a welcome relief. This has been well detailed by Robert Cook-
Deegan, who noted that Myriad “broke from professional standards”
by enforcing its broad patents to “establish a U.S. service monopoly
and flout clinical guidelines in its own testing and to impose a narrow
definition of research on others’ BRCA testing.”2
In 2014, however, the Court decided another patent eligibility case,
Alice Corp. Pty. v. CLS Bank International, which established a wholly
unworkable two-part test for patent eligibility. Alice Corp. now directs
courts to assess patent eligibility by first asking whether a patent is
“directed” to an “ineligible concept,” and, second, by asking whether
the invention adds “something more” than that.3 Alice Corp.’s enigmatic
language and its trajectory in the Supreme Court’s larger restrictions to
patentable subject matter have led courts to invalidate patents repeatedly
on eligibility grounds. Since Alice Corp., the number of patents invali-
dated in litigation for failing to meet § 101 has risen roughly tenfold.4
This has made Alice Corp. the bugaboo of both industry and patent at-
torneys, who have sounded a steady drumbeat for Congress to clarify
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it. But this has caused patent and public health scholars to worry that
alterations to the 229-year-old statute, and the doctrine interpreting
it, will reinvigorate the patenting of medical diagnostics, which when
coupled with miserly licensing regimes will lead to the ills uncovered
in Myriad Genetics.
Recent Proposals
Since Alice Corp., there have been a number of proposals from the bar to
rewrite § 101, including revisions from the American Bar Association
(ABA) and the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA).
One proposal—recently put forth by Senators Thom Tillis and Chris
Coons and the subject of hearings in the US Senate—bars all judicial
exceptions to § 101, including those pertaining to natural laws, products,
or phenomena or abstract ideas.5 Aside from dispensing with Alice Corp.,
this proposal was crafted with the express purpose of overruling the
restrictions imposed by Myriad Genetics and Mayo Collaborative Services.
This has led some to fear that such retrograde expansions to patentable
subject matter will make public health suffer as a consequence.
Tying public health and medical innovation directly to patentable
eligibility—as both the advocates and detractors of the doctrine have
done—is tenuous. Health technology often changes rapidly during the
term of a patent, blunting its power. The market for certain interven-
tions may change dramatically, too. And, even if an important parcel
of public health is eligible for patent protection, it does not mean the
technology will be patented; there are numerous other restrictions to
the patent statute that may prevent a large swath of innovations from
being exclusively owned. Even during the height of Myriad’s patents’
power, in the early 2000s, genetic sequencing technology was quickly
advancing toward whole genome sequencing—a technology that was
likely outside the scope of Myriad’s most controversial patents. To be
clear, patents often do cover next-generation sequencing technologies.
But, despite patent protection, there often is robust competition and
clinically reliable alternatives to any given next-generation sequencing
technique. It is not clear that revising § 101 will produce the negative
public health consequences many seem to fear. In any event, it is wholly
unlikely that even the recent Tillis-Coons draft bill overruling Myriad
will reproduce the same conditions that gave rise to it. Technology and
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the standard of care have long since moved beyond those at issue when
Myriad Genetics was decided.
And, yet, while it is unlikely that Myriad will be replicated, clini-
cians are right to be worried that expanding patent eligibility to the
unknown will allow overly broad patents on basic new technologies that
ultimately may be beneficial to public health. A patent covering all forms
of a newly discovered therapeutic technology—say, genome editing—
would almost certainly depress competition, not to mention physician
and patient choice. Such fears are real. In many other areas of technology,
overly broad patenting gives rise to serious problems: increased litiga-
tion, technological and licensing inefficiencies, and increased costs to
third-party development. These are particularly concerning for the US
health care system, which can barely afford unpatented legacy treatments
for many. Taxing it with these additional patent-related costs bodes ill
for the public health system.
This is the bane and boon of loose patent eligibility standards, and
one of the reasons Congress chose such ambiguous language even back in
1790. Because the policy implications of an unknown and unforeseeable
technological future cannot be determined with any degree of certainty,
patent eligibility serves as a gatekeeper to the unknown. Wielding it
as a weapon to police the future—either under a pro-innovation banner
or under a public health one—will almost certainly have unintended
consequences.
Planning for the Future
Although Alice Corp. is genuinely unworkable, and current proposals run
the risk of making matters worse rather than better, this is not to say
that Congress should do nothing. Congress would do well to consider
proposals that excise Alice Corp. without eliminating the wisdom—
however problematic—of Mayo Collaborative Services and Myriad Genetics.
A Congress invested in both public health and innovation would be wise
to deliberate them—for the sake both of today and of an unknown (and
unpredictable) future.
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